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Using Genetic Algorithm In Dynamic Model Of Speculative Attack

Author

Listed:
  • Bogna Gawronska-Nowak

    (Lazarski University)

  • Wojciech Grabowski

    (University of Lodz)

Abstract

Evolution of speculative attack models shows certain progress in developing the idea of the role of expectations in the crisis mechanism. Obstfeld (1996) defines expectations as fully exogenous. Morris and Shin (1998) treat the expectations as endogenous (with respect to noise), not devoting too much attention to information structure of the foreign exchange market. Dynamic approach proposed by Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) offers more sophisticated assumption about learning process. It tries to reflect time-variant and complex nature of information. However, this model ignores many important details like a Central Bank cost function. Genetic algorithm allows to avoid problems connected with incorporating information and expectations into agent decision-making process to an extent. There are some similarities between the evolution in Nature and currency market performance. In our paper an assumption about rational agent behaviour in the efficient market is criticised and we present our version of the dynamic model of a speculative attack, in which we use a genetic algorithm (GA) to define decision-making process of the currency market agents. The results of our simulation seem to be in line with the theory and intuition. An advantage of our model is that it reflects reality in a quite complex way, i.e. level of noise changes in time (decreasing), there are different states of fundamentals (with “more sensitive” upper part of the scale), the number of inflowing agents can be low or high (due to different globalization phases, different capital flow phases, different uncertainty levels).

Suggested Citation

  • Bogna Gawronska-Nowak & Wojciech Grabowski, 2016. "Using Genetic Algorithm In Dynamic Model Of Speculative Attack," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 11(2), pages 287-306, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:11:y:2016:i:2:p:287-306
    DOI: 10.12775/EQUIL.2016.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    2. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-1061.
    3. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
    4. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(3), pages 452-484, June.
    5. Arifovic, Jasmina & Maschek, Michael K., 2012. "Currency crisis: Evolution of beliefs and policy experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 131-150.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    currency crisis; dynamic model; genetic algorithms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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