Appropriate Measures to Use Money Laundering Prevention as an Antidote to Tax Evasion
Money laundering, which is closely linked with tax evasion and informal trade, is facilitated by the poorly regulated financial institutions of "mafia nations". These nations make billions of dollars by laundering money and giving safe haven to drug dealers and corrupt politicians, allowing them to transfer money globally. Money laundering prevention policies require financial institutions to periodically update their customer's personal information. Furthermore, they attemp to match tax and transaction reports collected from banks and non-banks around the world to detect tax evasion. This research explains how efficient policies for preventing money laundering can help reduce tax evasion.
Volume (Year): 10 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2005.
"Corruption And The Shadow Economy,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 817-836, 08.
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2002. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 633, CESifo Group Munich.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "Corruption and the shadow economy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/03, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2005. "Economic Freedom Versus Political Freedom: Cross-Country Influences On Corruption ," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 121-133, 06.
- Slemrod, Joel, 1998. "On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social Capital," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 3), pages 485-91, September.
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