IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jleorg/v14y1998i1p152-73.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia

Author

Listed:
  • Siow, Aloysius

Abstract

Modern universities sell (teach) knowledge of social and scientific advances. In carrying out their objective, universities have to address three related constraints: the problem of specialization as knowledge expands, research obsolescence, and the informational asymmetries between a university and its faculty. This article explores how distinctive features of academia, including peer review, tenure, up or out rules, the negative seniority wage premium, the role of outside offers, and the proliferation of academic journals alleviate these constraints. This article also studies how these issues affect the evolution of the organization of academia in North America. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Siow, Aloysius, 1998. "Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 152-173, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:152-73
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Noe, Thomas H, 1997. "Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 287-318, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. K. Sonin & I. Khovanskaya & M. Yudkevich., 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
    2. Mangematin, V., 2000. "PhD job market: professional trajectories and incentives during the PhD," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 741-756, June.
    3. Anne Casati & Corine Genet, 2014. "Principal investigators as scientific entrepreneurs," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 11-32, February.
    4. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Self-Promoting Investments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
    5. Cunningham, Brendan M., 2009. "Faculty: Thy administrator's keeper? Some evidence," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 444-453, August.
    6. Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, EconWPA.
    7. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 2002. "Studying Ourselves: The Academic Labor Market," NBER Working Papers 8965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Marie C. Thursby & Jerry Thursby & Swasti Gupta-Mukherjee, 2007. "Are There Real Effects of Licensing on Academic Research? A Life Cycle View," NBER Chapters,in: Academic Science and Entrepreneurship: Dual Engines of Growth National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Banerjee, Dyuti S. & Gaston, Noel, 2004. "Labour market signalling and job turnover revisited," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 599-622, October.
    10. Darius Lakdawalla, 2001. "The Declining Quality of Teachers," NBER Working Papers 8263, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. A. Abigail Payne & Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Estimating the Effects of Federal Research Funding on Universities using Alumni Representation on Congressional Appropriations Committees," Working Papers siow-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    12. Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2011. "Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 323-354, February.
    13. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Chen, Zhao & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2009. "Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 300-308, March.
    15. Ferris, J. Stephen & McKee, Michael, 2005. "Matching Candidates with Academic Teams: A Case for Academic Tenure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 290-310, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:152-73. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.