Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an important public policy question arose as to whether, and how, the federal government should intervene to provide a temporary backstop for property/casualty terrorism risk insurance. This paper examines several economic justifications for intervention and the rationale behind the Administration’s proposal for a temporary and limited government program.
Volume (Year): 55 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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