Transactions & Institutions
Theoretical positions which characterized self dependence of elements of system "transactions - costs - institutions" was elaborated. It was shown that the economical transactions may be divided into transactions for information search, market analysis, law defense, defense from opportunism and production promotion. The transactional costs classification is possible by the description as the nonproduction costs and on the base of the enterprise market potential structure. The transactional costs on the creation and development of the stable norm of interaction between economic agents may be determined as the cost estimation of the economic institutions. The empirical measured results of academic organizations mobility dependences from transaction costs were shown as the practice illustration for present research.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Heinesen, Eskil, 1995. "The two-variable CES transaction function in macroeconomic rationing models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 257-265, June.
- Steven Globerman & Thomas W Roehl & Stephen Standifird, 2001. "Globalization and Electronic Commerce: Inferences from Retail Brokering," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 32(4), pages 749-768, December.
- Alexandre B. Cunha, 2006.
"The Optimality Of The Friedman Rule When Some Distorting Taxes Are Exogenous,"
Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting]
45, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
- Alexandre Cunha, 2008. "The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 267-291, May.
- Alexandre B. Cunha, 2005. "The Optimality of the Friedman Rule When Some Distorting Taxes Are Exogenous," IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers 2005-06, Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro.
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