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Union Power as a Reason for Europe Not to Introduce Experience Rating?

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  • Florian Baumann
  • Nikolai Stähler

Abstract

Theoretical economic literature dealing with the financing of unemployment insurance finds that experience rating helps to solve the externality caused by individually efficient but socially inefficient dismissals and hence reduces unemployment. This is, however, found in models where workers and firms bargain over wages individually. Introducing unionized wage bargaining - which at least in continental Europe is a defining feature of the economy - may reverse the result. This paper provides an example showing that wage setting by a monopoly union can result in an increase in unemployment

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Baumann & Nikolai Stähler, 2008. "Union Power as a Reason for Europe Not to Introduce Experience Rating?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 568-585, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200809)164:3_568:upaarf_2.0.tx_2-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Behaghel, Luc & Crépon, Bruno & Sédillot, Béatrice, 2008. "The perverse effects of partial employment protection reform: The case of French older workers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 696-721, April.
    2. Burdett, Kenneth & Wright, Randall, 1989. "Optimal firm size, taxes, and unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 275-287, August.
    3. Anderson, Patricia M. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2000. "The effects of the unemployment insurance payroll tax on wages, employment, claims and denials," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 81-106, October.
    4. Julia Fath & Clemens Fuest, 2005. "Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(4), pages 471-483, November.
    5. Elhanan Helpman & Marc J. Melitz & Stephen R. Yeaple, 2004. "Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 300-316, March.
    6. Cahuc, Pierre & Malherbet, Franck, 2004. "Unemployment compensation finance and labor market rigidity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 481-501, March.
    7. Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg & Heinrich Ursprung, 2010. "A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 137-163, October.
    8. Florian Baumann & Nikolai Stähler, 2006. "Financing Unemployment Benefits: Dismissal versus Employment Taxes," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(3), pages 433-451, September.
    9. Pietro Garibaldi & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 799-832, October.
    10. Olivier L'Haridon & Franck Malherbet, 2002. "Unemployment Compensation Finance and Aggregate Employment Fluctuations," Working Papers 2002-48, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    11. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Moser, Christoph & Stähler, Nikolai, 2009. "Spillover effects of minimum wages in a two-sector search model," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2009,01, Deutsche Bundesbank.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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