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Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model

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  • Christoph Engel

Abstract

Corporate actors differ from individuals in that it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to influence its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technique is inducing corporate actors to hire an interface actor, representing the regulatory cause in the interior of the firm. Vice versa, firms may induce the regulator to give an interface actor access to the regulatory arena. This interface actor has the task of representing the commercial cause in regulatory decision-making. The paper uses a principal-agent-supervisor model to analyze the setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel, 2006. "Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 104-124, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200603)162:1_104:cdfrap_2.0.tx_2-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Adler, Matthew D & Posner, Eric A, 2000. "Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives: Introduction," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 837-842, June.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2006. "The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_1, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Urs Schweizer, 2006. "Corporate Design for Regulability. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 130-133, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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