Corporate Design for Regulability. A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Christoph Engel, 2006. "Corporate Design for Regulability: A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 104-124, March.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Adler, Matthew D & Posner, Eric A, 2000. "Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives: Introduction," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, pages 837-842.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hellwig, Martin F., 2007.
"The undesirability of randomized income taxation under decreasing risk aversion,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 791-816, April.
- Christoph Engel, 2006. "The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_1, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Urs Schweizer, 2006. "Corporate Design for Regulability. Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(1), pages 130-133, March.
More about this item
Keywordsprincipal-agent-supervisor; corporate actor; corporate governance; regulatory procedure; governance; interface actor;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-09-17 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2005-09-17 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-09-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2005-09-17 (Regulation)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marc Martin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .