An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium
In identifying the free riders in the voluntary provision of a pure public good, Andreoni and McGuire (1993) simplify Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian's (1986)algorithm by systematizing the selection process of potential contributors. We propose an alternative algorithm in which a concept of no-free-rider Nash equilibrium is utilized to identify potentially a large fraction of free riders in Nash equilibrium without conducting any Nash solution tests for them.
Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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