The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: An Economic Analysis
This paper provides an economic analysis of the post-war regulation of European tenancy markets. Two representative types of market regulation are analyzed: the introduction of compulsory duration clauses in tenancy contracts (as a means of protecting the tenant against eviction); and rent control policies. First, the study describes and analyzes the recent history of such regulations in Spain, Italy, Finland and the UK, in order to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of European institutions in recent decades. Their effects are then explored by adapting a theoretical model of tenancy markets. The results show that both rent control and compulsory duration clauses potentially entail negative effects for European tenancy markets as they may drive some participants out of the market. These effects are consistent with the trends observed during the latter half of the 20th century in several European countries.
Volume (Year): 8 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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