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Közgazdaságtan és gazdaságtörténet találkozása a fúziókontrollban
[Economics meets economic history in merger control]

Author

Listed:
  • Valentiny, Pál

Abstract

A tanulmány a fúziókontroll során felmerülő nehézségekhez, a közgazdasági bizonyítékok és a vállalati magatartás értelmezéséhez kíván hozzászólni. Az utóbbi években az Egyesült Államokban megerősödött az a nézet, hogy a fúziók engedélyezése túl engedékenynek bizonyult, a piaci koncentráció erősödött, gyakorivá vált a potenciális versenytársak felvásárlása. A 20. század elején lezajlott Fisher Body-General Motors-egyesülés megítélése évtizedekre a vertikális integráció közgazdasági példájává vált - egészen addig, amíg ennek példaértékét nem vetették alaposabb vizsgálat alá. A fúziókontroll jelenlegi megújítási szándéka fényében próbáljuk ezt a folyamatot a közgazdasági elmélet és a gazdaságtörténet egymásrautaltságával bemutatni.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentiny, Pál, 2025. "Közgazdaságtan és gazdaságtörténet találkozása a fúziókontrollban [Economics meets economic history in merger control]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(4), pages 350-368.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:2243
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2025.4.350
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L62 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment; Related Parts and Equipment
    • N62 - Economic History - - Manufacturing and Construction - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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