Distress risk puzzle and analyst forecast optimism

A general consensus in the literature is that financial analysts make optimistic forecasts. That is, they tend to underreact to negative but overreact to positive information. In this study, we invoke this idea to provide an explanation for the distress risk puzzle, the phenomenon that high distress risk firms deliver anomalously low subsequent returns. We find that analysts underestimate the implication of the poor performance of higher distress risk firms, and thus make EPS and sales forecasts that are generally more optimistic than those for the lower distress risk firms. Because market respond to the analyst forecasts, investors initially overvalue the high distress risk firms; later on, when those firms report less than expected performance, analysts revise their forecasts downwards that in turn cause the high distress risk firms to earn low future returns composing of both immediate-forecast-revision responses and post-forecast-revision price drifts. We further document that (quarter) earnings announcements convey a substantial amount of information that roughly drives more than 60% of the analyst forecast revisions and 30% of the revision-related market responses.