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Economics at the FCC, 2011–2012: Spectrum Incentive Auctions, Universal Service and Intercarrier Compensation Reform, and Mergers

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  • Evan Kwerel
  • Paul LaFontaine
  • Marius Schwartz

Abstract

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission covered a broad range of topics in telecommunications policy. This paper highlights the economic issues that are addressed in the following key areas: spectrum management, universal service and intercarrier compensation reform, and merger review. In spectrum management, the FCC received congressional authority to implement an “incentive auction” to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum into flexible-use licenses that will be suitable for mobile wireless service providers. We discuss some important issues in designing the auction. We next address some aspects of the FCC’s comprehensive reforms of intercarrier compensation, which mainly involves call termination rates, and of universal service. Finally, we discuss the economic analysis of two major mergers: AT&T-T-Mobile, which the FCC staff recommended should be referred to an administrative hearing, and Level 3/Global Crossing, which was cleared with no conditions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York (outside the USA) 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Evan Kwerel & Paul LaFontaine & Marius Schwartz, 2012. "Economics at the FCC, 2011–2012: Spectrum Incentive Auctions, Universal Service and Intercarrier Compensation Reform, and Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(4), pages 271-302, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:271-302
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-012-9362-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vogelsang Ingo, 2013. "The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 64(3), pages 193-270, December.
    2. I. Vogelsang, 2015. "Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(2), pages 117-155, June.
    3. Eric Ralph & Susan Singer & Steven Wildman, 2013. "Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission, 2012–2013," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(4), pages 327-348, December.
    4. Yongmin Chen & Marius Schwartz, 2015. "Churn vs. Diversion: An Illustrative Model," Working Papers gueconwpa~15-15-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Babette Boliek & Kim Makuch & Catherine Matraves & Aleks Yankelevich, 2019. "Economics at the FCC 2018–2019: Competition, Broadband Deployment, and Transaction Review," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(4), pages 625-646, December.
    6. Sergey Zhavoronkov & Konstantin Yanovskiy, 2013. "Плоды социального либерализма и некоторые причины устойчивости выбора неэффективных стратегий (Fruits of the Social Liberalism and some reasons of inefficient strategies choices' stability)," Working Papers 145, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2015.
    7. Yongmin Chen & Marius Schwartz, 2016. "Churn Versus Diversion in Antitrust: An Illustrative Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 564-583, October.

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