Churn vs. Diversion: An Illustrative Model
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- Yongmin Chen & Marius Schwartz, 2016. "Churn Versus Diversion in Antitrust: An Illustrative Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 564-583, October.
More about this item
Keywordschurn ratio; diversion ratio; merger; unilateral price effects; antitrust;
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-09-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2015-09-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2015-09-05 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2015-09-05 (Marketing)
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