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Privatizing Highways in the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Engel

    ()

  • Ronald Fischer

    ()

  • Alexander Galetovic

    ()

Abstract

We review the experience of both private toll-roads built in the United States during the 1990s, and argue that the problems they encountered could have been avoided if the length of the franchise contract would adapt to demand realizations. We also argue in favor of adjudicating private toll-roads via BOT-type contracts in competitive (Demsetz) auctions. The lessons of this paper are relevant since growing congestion and troubled government finances have made private toll-roads increasingly attractive in the United States. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2006. "Privatizing Highways in the United States," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(1), pages 27-53, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:27-53
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-9108-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adams, Matthew & Hiatt, Rachel & Hill, Mary C. & Russo, Ryan & Wachs, Martin & Weinstein, Asha, 2001. "Financing Transportation in California: Strategies for Change (Final Draft)," Institute of Transportation Studies, Research Reports, Working Papers, Proceedings qt7fh2v7zd, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Berkeley.
    2. Clifford Winston, 2000. "Government Failure in Urban Transportation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 21(4), pages 403-425, December.
    3. Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
    4. J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stephane Straub, 2003. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America," ESE Discussion Papers 103, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    5. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024.
    6. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Infraestructure Franchising and Government Guarantees," Documentos de Trabajo 29, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    8. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Privatizing Highways in Latin America: Fixing What Went Wrong," ECONOMIA JOURNAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2003), pages 129-164, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. de Brux, Julie, 2010. "The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 77-85, June.
    2. Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane, 2007. "Contractual flexibility or rigidity for public private partnerships? Theory and evidence from infrastructure concession contracts," MPRA Paper 10541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Geddes, R. Richard & Wagner, Benjamin L., 2013. "Why do U.S. states adopt public–private partnership enabling legislation?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 30-41.
    4. Jean-Michel Glachant & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Introduction," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(1), pages 1-2, September.
    5. Rouhani, Omid M. & Niemeier, Debbie & Knittel, Christopher R. & Madani, Kaveh, 2013. "Integrated modeling framework for leasing urban roads: A case study of Fresno, California," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 17-30.
    6. Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2009. "Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship," Working Papers 09-0106, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    7. Viegas, José M., 2010. "Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 139-144.
    8. Winston, Clifford & Yan, Jia, 2011. "Can privatization of U.S. highways improve motorists' welfare?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 993-1005.
    9. Clifford Winston & Jia Yan, 2008. "US Highway Privatization and Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Papers 2008-20, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    10. Desrieux, Claudine & Chong, Eshien & Saussier, Stéphane, 2013. "Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 167-186.
    11. Athias, Laure, 2007. "Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships," MPRA Paper 10538, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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