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Infraestructure Franchising and Government Guarantees

Author

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  • Eduardo Engel

    ()

  • Ronald Fischer

    ()

  • Alexander Galetovic

    ()

Abstract

Government guarantees for private infrastructure projects reduce the incentives of firms to perform efficiently, weaken the incentives to screen projects for white elephants, and shift government obligations to future periods. Thus the uses of guarantees needs to be limited, and they need to be carefully designed. Franchising schemes should in principle assign risk to the parties best able to manage and control them. The mechanisms by which contracts are awarded should be simple, so that possibilities for evaluator subjectivity are reduced, the award process remains as transparent as possible, and the likelihood of having to renegotiate is minimized. Infrastructure franchises have usually been awarded on a fixed-terms basis. Such contracts expose franchise holders to considerable demand risk, which investors are often unwilling to assume without government guarantees. These contacts are also inflexible, since it is difficult to determine a fair level of compensation to the franchise holder if the contract is terminated early o modified. Under a alternative mechanism, the franchise is awarded to the firm that asks for the least present value of use fee revenue for a given tariff structure, and the franchise ends when the present value of user fee revenues is equal to the franchise holder's bid. Such contracts reduce the demand risk borne by the franchise holder (and the concomitant demand for governments guarantees). They also make fair compensation of franchise holders in the event of early termination straight-forward, since the level of fair compensation is equal to the revenue remaining to be collected.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Infraestructure Franchising and Government Guarantees," Documentos de Trabajo 29, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:29
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    Cited by:

    1. Engel Eduardo M & Fischer Ronald & Galetovic Alexander, 2004. "Toll Competition Among Congested Roads," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-21, March.
    2. Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 2005. "Highway franchising and real estate values," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 432-448, May.
    3. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2006. "Privatizing Highways in the United States," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(1), pages 27-53, September.
    4. William Easterly, 1999. "When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 14(28), pages 55-86, April.
    5. Israel Fainboim Yaker & Carlos Jorge Rodríguez & Juan Benavides & Julio César Alonso, 2001. "Participación Privada en Proyectos de Infraestructura y Determinantes de los Esquemas Contractuales Adoptados: El Caso Colombiano," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2115, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Irwin, Timothy & Klein, Michael & Perry, Guillermo E. & Thobani, Mateen, 1999. "Managing Government Exposure to Private Infrastructure Risks," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(2), pages 229-245, August.

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