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Against the stand-alone-cost test in U.S. freight rail regulation

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  • Russell Pittman

Abstract

The stand-alone-cost test has become an expensive, extensive, and time-consuming part of the regulatory practice of the U.S. Surface Transportation Board in the performance of its statutory duty to protect "captive shippers" from monopoly rail rates. Worse, a close examination of the history of its adoption and application suggests only a very tenuous connection with its claimed intellectual foundations, the classic works of Faulhaber (1975) and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982). It is time to retire this tool and replace it with something simpler and more effective and transparent.
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Suggested Citation

  • Russell Pittman, 2010. "Against the stand-alone-cost test in U.S. freight rail regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 313-326, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:38:y:2010:i:3:p:313-326
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-010-9130-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Russell Pittman, 2004. "Russian Railways Reform and the Problem of Non‐discriminatory Access to Infrastructure," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 167-192, June.
    2. Burton, Mark L, 1993. "Railroad Deregulation, Carrier Behavior, and Shipper Response: A Disaggregated Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 417-434, December.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    4. Meitzen, Mark E. & Larson, Alexander C., 1992. "The uses and abuses of stand-alone costs," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 135-148, April.
    5. Ellig, Jerry, 2002. "Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 143-167, March.
    6. Lenard, Thomas M & Bettendorf, Monica M & McGonegal, Stephen, 1992. "Stand-Alone Costs, Ramsey Prices, and Postal Rates," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 243-262, September.
    7. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
    8. Gaskins Darius W., 2008. "Regulation of Freight Railroads in the Modern Era: 1970 - 2010," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-12, December.
    9. Alfred E. Kahn, 1988. "The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262610523, December.
    10. Gerald R. Faulhaber, 2005. "Cross-Subsidy Analysis With More Than Two Services," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(3), pages 441-448.
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    Cited by:

    1. John W. Mayo & David E. M. Sappington, 2016. "Regulation in a ‘Deregulated’ Industry: Railroads in the Post-Staggers Era," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 203-227, September.
    2. McCullough, Gerard J., 2015. "Constrained Market Pricing and Revenue Adequacy: Regulatory Implications for Shippers and Class I U.S. Freight Railroads," Staff Papers 207766, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    3. Wesley W. Wilson & Frank A. Wolak, 2018. "Benchmark Regulation of Multiproduct Firms: An Application to the Rail Industry," NBER Working Papers 25268, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. T. Randolph Beard & Jeffrey Thomas Macher & Chris Vickers, 2016. "This Time is Different (?): Telecommunications Unbundling and Lessons for Railroad Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 289-310, September.
    5. Wesley W. Wilson & Frank A. Wolak, 2016. "Freight Rail Costing and Regulation: The Uniform Rail Costing System," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 229-261, September.
    6. Richard L. Schmalensee & Wesley W. Wilson, 2016. "Modernizing U.S. Freight Rail Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 133-159, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Railroads; Regulation; Stand alone cost; Surface Transportation Board; Cross-subsidy; Contestability; K23; L51; L92;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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