Incentive Contracts for Infrastructure, Litigation and Weak Institutions
In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
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- Kerf, M. & Gray, R.D. & Irwin, T. & Levesque, C. & Taylor, R.R. & Klein, M., 1998. "Concessions for Infrastructure. A Guide to their Design and Award," Papers 399, World Bank - Technical Papers.
- J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024.
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