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An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions

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  • Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis

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  • Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis, 2012. "An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 497-515, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:3:p:497-515
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9755-x
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    1. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
    2. Josephson, Jens & Wärneryd, Karl, 2008. "Long-run selection and the work ethic," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 354-365, May.
    3. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    4. Jack A. Goldstone, 1994. "Is Revolution Individually Rational?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 6(1), pages 139-166, January.
    5. Lohmann, Susanne, 2000. "Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 655-684, December.
    6. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    7. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
    8. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-921, September.
    9. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
    10. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    11. Weibull, Jorgen W., 1994. "The 'as if' approach to game theory: Three positive results and four obstacles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 868-881, April.
    12. Susanne Lohmann, 2000. "Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 655-684, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camacho, Carmen & Hassan, Waleed, 2023. "The dynamics of revolution: Discrimination, social unrest and the optimal timing of revolution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    2. Andrew Marcum & David Skarbek, 2014. "Why didn’t slaves revolt more often during the Middle Passage?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(2), pages 236-262, May.
    3. Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," PSE Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.
    4. George Tridimas, 2014. "Why some democracies are headed by a monarch?," ICER Working Papers 07-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    5. Carmen Camacho & Waleed Hassan, 2023. "People Get Ready: Optimal timing of Revolution," Working Papers halshs-03372991, HAL.
    6. Tridimas, George, 2015. "War, disenfranchisement and the fall of the ancient Athenian democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 102-117.

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