Monetary Unions in Historical Perspective: What Future for the Euro in the International Financial System
This paper discusses the introduction of the euro in the present international monetary context. European Monetary Union is not only an economic concept but also primarily a political one. Based on past experience, two aspects of monetary union seem essential: the nature of the future European Central Bank and the necessity that monetary union is implemented with a fiscal union. The euro's success on world markets, as a dollar substitute, depends on monetary authorities' credibility in targeting low-inflation, and on fiscal authorities' reputation. A central bank that does not respond to a political authority can cause social difficulties, especially if social policies are left in the hands of single countries and fiscal transfers, to support these policies, are not allowed Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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