On the design of invoicing practices in international trade
We advance an explanation for the choice of the invoice currency of international trade contracts on the basis of strategic bargaining considerations. The choice of the invoice currency originates in a situation in which each trader takes into account the other party's bargaining power. The latter depends on the individual discount factor, whether one is the first or second proposer, and whether one is on the short or long side of the market. Along these lines we explain the Grassman bias for trade contracts to be invoiced in the exporter's currency. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992
Volume (Year): 3 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/international+economics/journal/11079/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ethier, Wilfred, 1973. "International Trade and the Forward Exchange Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 494-503, June.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Black, Stanley W., 1985. "International money and international monetary arrangements," Handbook of International Economics,in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1153-1193 Elsevier.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
- Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
- John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
- G. Basevi & D. Cocchi & P. L. Lischi, 1985. "The Choice of Currency in the Foreign Trade of Italy," Working Papers 17, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Grassman, Sven, 1973. "A fundamental symmetry in international payment patterns," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 105-116, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:133-142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.