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On the design of invoicing practices in international trade

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  • Jean-Marie Viaene
  • Casper Vries

Abstract

We advance an explanation for the choice of the invoice currency of international trade contracts on the basis of strategic bargaining considerations. The choice of the invoice currency originates in a situation in which each trader takes into account the other party's bargaining power. The latter depends on the individual discount factor, whether one is the first or second proposer, and whether one is on the short or long side of the market. Along these lines we explain the Grassman bias for trade contracts to be invoiced in the exporter's currency. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marie Viaene & Casper Vries, 1992. "On the design of invoicing practices in international trade," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 133-142, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:133-142
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01886200
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ethier, Wilfred, 1973. "International Trade and the Forward Exchange Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 494-503, June.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Black, Stanley W., 1985. "International money and international monetary arrangements," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1153-1193, Elsevier.
    4. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    5. G. Basevi & D. Cocchi & P. L. Lischi, 1985. "The Choice of Currency in the Foreign Trade of Italy," Working Papers 17, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    6. Grassman, Sven, 1973. "A fundamental symmetry in international payment patterns," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 105-116, May.
    7. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ligthart, Jenny E. & Werner, Sebastian E.V., 2012. "Has the euro affected the choice of invoicing currency?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1551-1573.
    2. Bacchetta, Philippe & van Wincoop, Eric, 2005. "A theory of the currency denomination of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 295-319, December.
    3. Yung-Chul Park & Kwanho Shin, 2011. "Internationalisation of currency in East Asia: implications for regional monetary and financial cooperation," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Currency internationalisation: lessons from the global financial crisis and prospects for the future in Asia and the Pacific, volume 61, pages 180-197, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Friberg, Richard & Wilander, Fredrik, 2008. "The currency denomination of exports -- A questionnaire study," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 54-69, May.
    5. Martin Brown & Steven Ongena & Pinar Yeşin, 2014. "Information Asymmetry and Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 56(1), pages 110-131, March.
    6. Mileva, Elitza & Siegfried, Nikolaus, 2012. "Oil market structure, network effects and the choice of currency for oil invoicing," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 385-394.
    7. Nagesh N. Murthy & Milind Shrikhande & Ajay Subramanian, 2007. "Switching costs, dynamic uncertainty, and buyer–seller relationships," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(8), pages 859-873, December.
    8. Philip Turner, 2012. "Macroprudential policies in EMEs: theory and practice," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Financial sector regulation for growth, equity and stability, volume 62, pages 125-139, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Ligthart, J.E. & Da Silva, J., 2007. "Currency Invoicing in International Trade : A Panel Data Approach," Other publications TiSEM 861fb576-0ae9-4da6-9589-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Brown, M. & Ongena, S. & Yesin, P., 2008. "Currency Denomination of Bank Loans : Evidence from Small Firms in Transition Countries," Discussion Paper 2008-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Shabtai Donnenfeld & Alfred Haug, 2003. "Currency Invoicing in International Trade: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 332-345, May.
    12. Kamps, Annette, 2006. "The euro as invoicing currency in international trade," Working Paper Series 665, European Central Bank.
    13. Friberg, Richard, 1998. "In which currency should exporters set their prices?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 59-76, June.
    14. Ongena, Steven & Brown, Martin & Yeşin, Pınar, 2009. "Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 7540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Goldberg, Linda S. & Tille, Cédric, 2009. "Micro, Macro, and Strategic Forces in International Trade Invoicing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7534, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Hartmann, Philipp, 1998. "The Currency Denomination of World Trade after European Monetary Union," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 424-454, December.

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