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Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

Author

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  • Atsuyuki Ohyama

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  • Motoh Tsujimura

Abstract

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura ( 2005 ). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Atsuyuki Ohyama & Motoh Tsujimura, 2006. "Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(2), pages 109-135, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:35:y:2006:i:2:p:109-135
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9010-6
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-006-9010-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lambrecht, Bart & Perraudin, William, 2003. "Real options and preemption under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 619-643, February.
    2. Pindyck, Robert S., 2000. "Irreversibilities and the timing of environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 233-259, July.
    3. Pindyck, Robert S., 2002. "Optimal timing problems in environmental economics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(9-10), pages 1677-1697, August.
    4. Margaret Insley, 2003. "On the option to invest in pollution control under a regime of tradable emissions allowances," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 860-883, November.
    5. Grenadier, Steven R, 1996. " The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1653-1679, December.
    6. Nalin Kulatilaka & Enrico C. Perotti, 1998. "Strategic Growth Options," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1021-1031, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Agliardi, Elettra & Sereno, Luigi, 2011. "The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2793-2802.
    2. E. Agliardi & L. Sereno, 2012. "On the optimal timing of switching from non-renewable to renewable resources: dirty vs clean energy sources and the relative efficiency of generators," Working Papers wp855, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Agliardi, Elettra & Sereno, Luigi, 2012. "Environmental protection, public finance requirements and the timing of emission reductions," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(06), pages 715-739, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    environmental subsidy; environmental tax; external effects; real options; tradable emission permits; Q53; C72; G19;

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other

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