IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/atlecj/v35y2007i4p399-409.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process

Author

Listed:
  • Edward Kane

    ()

Abstract

Basel II consists of supervisory guidelines negotiated by representatives of central banks and national regulatory commissions that were members of the Basel committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS is itself a regulatory response to globalization, which is connecting national safety nets in market-driven ways. A country’s financial safety net is a social contract established by short-lived agents for principals in long-lived economic sectors. Restraints placed on the authority of the BCBS members to contract for their principals by domestic politics explains: why Basel II authorizes individual countries to implement the agreement in markedly different ways; why US implementation of Basel II ran into so much doubt, controversy, and delay; and how the implementation debate set small and large banks and the Federal Reserve and other federal regulators against one another. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Edward Kane, 2007. "Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(4), pages 399-409, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:35:y:2007:i:4:p:399-409
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-007-9095-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11293-007-9095-5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    2. Rasmusen Eric Bennett, 2001. "Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-39, October.
    3. Edward Kane, 2007. "Basel II: A Contracting Perspective," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 32(1), pages 39-53, October.
    4. María J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors' prompt corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the European Union?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    5. Edward J. Kane & Rosalind Bennett & Robert Oshinsky, 2008. "Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA," NBER Working Papers 14576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 2006. "Home country versus cross-border negative externalities in large banking organization failures and how to avoid them," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. John Pattison, 2006. "International Financial Cooperation and the Number of Adherents: The Basel Committee and Capital Regulation," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 443-458, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Richard Herring, 2007. "The Rocky Road to Implementation of Basel II in the United States," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(4), pages 411-429, December.
    2. repec:ipf:finteo:v:39:y:2015:i:3:p:139-169 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel II; Bank regulation; Financial safety net; G21; G28; G38;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:35:y:2007:i:4:p:399-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.