Search and herding effects in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from prosper.com
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More about this item
KeywordsPeer-to-peer lending; Private and public information; D45; D53; D82; D83;
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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