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Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money- Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale

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  • Emily C. Schaeffer

    (George Mason University)

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  • Emily C. Schaeffer, 2008. "Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money- Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 24(Fall 2008), pages 95-117.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:597
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    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    3. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 857-882, December.
    4. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48.
    5. Timur Kuran, 1995. "Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 155-173, Fall.
    6. Edward Stringham, 2002. "The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 17(Spring 20), pages 1-19.
    7. Abdirashid A. Ismail, 2007. "Lawlessness and economic governance: the case ofhawala system in Somalia," International Journal of Development Issues, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 6(2), pages 168-185, May.
    8. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-291, April.
    9. Timur Kuran, 2004. "Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 71-90, Summer.
    10. Schramm, Matthias & Taube, Markus, 2003. "Evolution and institutional foundation of the hawala financial system," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 405-420.
    11. Avner Greif, 2002. "Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(1), pages 168-204, March.
    12. Cooter, Robert & Landa, Janet T., 1984. "Personal versus impersonal trade: The size of trading groups and contract law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 15-22, June.
    13. Kuran, T., 1995. "Islamic Economics and the Islamic Subeconomy," Papers 9505, Southern California - Department of Economics.
    14. Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-231, April.
    15. repec:hrv:faseco:34721963 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-950, October.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Dulce Redín & Reyes Calderón & Ignacio Ferrero, 2014. "Exploring the Ethical Dimension of Hawala," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 327-337, October.
    4. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    5. Durga Prasad Gautam, 2017. "Remittance inflows and starting a business," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 290-314, November.
    6. David J. Hebert, 2013. "Property Rights: Private or Public? Evidence from the Boston Frozen Water Trade," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 28(Spring 20), pages 113-123.
    7. Adam Martin, 2010. "The Analects of Boettke," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 26(Fall 2010), pages 125-141.
    8. Skarbek, David, 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 702-716, November.
    9. Roth, M. Garrett & Skarbek, David, 2014. "Prison Gangs and the Community Responsibility System," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(3), pages 223-243, May.

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