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The Distribution of Transfers and Taxes: Incentives and Implications for the US Deficit and Debt

Author

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  • Jody W. Lipford

    (Francis Marion University - United States of America)

Abstract

The United States, like many Western democracies, faces high and rising public debt that may be unsustainable in the long run. This US fiscal condition is the inevitable outcome of a political system that redistributes transfer payments broadly across citizen-voters and that restricts taxation narrowly across citizen-voters. US data since 1979 show exactly this pattern. These trends, often supported by vote-seeking politicians, pressures from citizen-voters, and political narratives, are commensurate with the country’s rising ratio of government debt to gross domestic product.

Suggested Citation

  • Jody W. Lipford, 2022. "The Distribution of Transfers and Taxes: Incentives and Implications for the US Deficit and Debt," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 37(4), pages 1-20.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1902
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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