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Qualité d’audit, concentration de l’actionnariat et reporting financier

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Gilles FOKA TAGNE
  • Prince Dubois KENFACK HIKOUATCHA
  • Joséphine Florentine MBADUET
  • Joseph NDASSI YEPGNOU

Abstract

L’objectif de cet article est d’étudier l’impact de la qualité d’audit externe et de la concentration de l’actionnariat sur la qualité du reporting financier. En s’appuyant sur la régression logistique et à partir des données recueillies par questionnaire auprès de 61 préparateurs des comptes, les résultats montrent que la probabilité d’avoir une information de qualité croît avec l’appartenance de l’auditeur à un réseau international et le montant des honoraires d’audit. Par ailleurs, cette probabilité évolue négativement avec la durée de collaboration entre l’auditeur et l’audité. On constate aussi que, d’une part, dans les entreprises où il y a concentration de l’actionnariat, la présence d’un auditeur appartenant à un réseau international permet d’améliorer la qualité du reporting financier et, d’autre part, que l’effet croisé des honoraires d’audit et de l’ancienneté de l’auditeur avec la concentration de l’actionnariat détériore les chances d’avoir une information de qualité.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Gilles FOKA TAGNE & Prince Dubois KENFACK HIKOUATCHA & Joséphine Florentine MBADUET & Joseph NDASSI YEPGNOU, 2018. "Qualité d’audit, concentration de l’actionnariat et reporting financier," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 9(1), pages 27-54, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:jaf:journl:v:9:y:2018:i:1:n:112
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Qualité de l’information; concentration de l’actionnariat; qualité d’audit externe; information quality; ownership concentration; quality of external audit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • N8 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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