Learning and Belief-Based Trade
We use the theory of learning in games to show that no-trade results do not require that gains from trade are common knowledge nor that play is a Nash Equilibrium.
Volume (Year): 42 (2005)
Issue (Month): 126 ()
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1995.
"Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play,"
3198694, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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