Strategic Pricing and Detailing Behavior in International Markets
We study three determinants of the levels of price and detailing effort across geographic markets: the within-market response to each variable, the nature of interfirm strategic interactions both within that market and across markets. We empirically examine the interactions of Prozac, Zoloft, and Paxil across the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. Our results indicate that all three factors driving marketing mix interactions are at play in this product category. The U.S. market is less price-sensitive than the European markets. Detailing elasticities are comparable across the United States, Germany, and Italy, while the United Kingdom and France show greater elasticity. For the U.S. market, we find that almost all deviations from Nash pricing and detailing levels are due to within-market interactions. In the U.K. market, deviations from Nash prices come about due mostly to across-market interactions—both with the United States as well as the rest of Europe, whereas deviations from Nash detailing levels are mainly due to across-market interactions with the United States. For Italy, we observe that both within and across-market interactions affect price and detailing levels. Overall, the pattern of interactions makes observed prices more similar across countries than prices implied by the estimated elasticities. This underscores the importance of considering within- and across-market interactions in developing multimarket strategy.
Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 7240 Parkway Drive, Suite 300, Hanover, MD 21076 USA|
Web page: http://www.informs.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ramarao Desiraju & Sridhar Moorthy, 1997. "Managing a Distribution Channel Under Asymmetric Information with Performance Requirements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(12), pages 1628-1644, December.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1998.
"Measuring Market Power in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry,"
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports
037, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
- Nevo, Aviv, 2001. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 307-42, March.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1998. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry," Research Reports 25164, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
- Aviv Nevo, 1998. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," NBER Working Papers 6387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aviv Nevo, 2003. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Microeconomics 0303006, EconWPA.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1999. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt7cm5p858, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-90, July.
- Philip M. Parker & Lars-Hendrik Roller, 1997. "Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 304-322, Summer.
- Luis M. B. Cabral, 2001.
"Multiproduct Oligopoly and Bertrand Supertraps,"
01-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Cabral, L.M.B., 2001. "Multiproduct Oligopoly and Bertrand Supertraps," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 01-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
- Daniel McFadden & Kenneth Train, 2000. "Mixed MNL models for discrete response," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 447-470.
- Rizzo, John A, 1999. "Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 89-116, April.
- Steven T. Berry, 1994. "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 242-262, Summer.
- Danzon, Patricia M. & Chao, Li-Wei, 2000. "Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how large, and why?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-195, March.
- John U. Farley & Donald R. Lehmann & Michael J. Ryan, 1982. "Patterns in Parameters of Buyer Behavior Models: Generalizing from Sparse Replication," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(2), pages 181-204.
- Hurwitz, Mark A & Caves, Richard E, 1988. "Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the Shares of Brand Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 299-320, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:24:y:2005:i:1:p:67-80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.