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The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly

  • Kohei Kamaga

    (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Japan)

  • Yasuhiko Nakamura

    (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Japan)

We analyze productivity-improving mergers in mixed triopoly and explore stable market structures. We find the only stable market structure contains a merged public-private firm and one private firm with about 57% of shares owned by the public firm.

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Article provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 181-198

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Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:6:y:2007:i:3:p:181-198
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  1. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  2. German Coloma, 2006. "Mergers and Acquisitions in Mixed-Oligopoly Markets," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(2), pages 147-159, August.
  3. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  4. Barros, Pedro Pita, 1998. "Endogenous mergers and size asymmetry of merger participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 113-119, July.
  5. Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Managerial Delegation and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 450-469, September.
  6. John S. Heywood & Matthew McGinty, 2007. "Mergers among leaders and mergers among followers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(12), pages 1-7.
  7. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
  8. Yoshio Kamijo & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2009. "Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 1-24, September.
  9. Duarte Brito & João Gata, 2006. "Merger stability in a three firm game," Working Papers 10, Portuguese Competition Authority.
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