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The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Kohei Kamaga

    (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Japan)

  • Yasuhiko Nakamura

    (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Japan)

Abstract

We analyze productivity-improving mergers in mixed triopoly and explore stable market structures. We find the only stable market structure contains a merged public-private firm and one private firm with about 57% of shares owned by the public firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohei Kamaga & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2007. "The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 6(3), pages 181-198, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:6:y:2007:i:3:p:181-198
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yoshio Kamijo & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2009. "Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 1-24.
    2. John S. Heywood & Matthew McGinty, 2007. "Mergers among leaders and mergers among followers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(12), pages 1-7.
    3. Duarte Brito & João Gata, 2006. "Merger stability in a three firm game," Working Papers 10, Portuguese Competition Authority.
    4. Barros, Pedro Pita, 1998. "Endogenous mergers and size asymmetry of merger participants," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 113-119, July.
    5. German Coloma, 2006. "Mergers and Acquisitions in Mixed-Oligopoly Markets," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(2), pages 147-159, August.
    6. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    7. Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Managerial Delegation and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 450-469, September.
    8. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 473-483.
    9. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 473-486.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yoshio Kamijo & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2009. "Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 1-24.
    2. Kai Andree, 2013. "A note on merger in mixed duopoly: Bertrand versus Cournot," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 291-298.
    3. Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara, 2015. "Incentives to merge in asymmetric mixed oligopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 885-895.
    4. Jean Bonnet & Sylvie Cieply & Marcus Dejardin, 2007. "Does the regional dimension matter as regards finance and entrepreneurship ?," Post-Print halshs-00337426, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    mergers; mixed oligopoly; the core of market structures;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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