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Mergers and Acquisitions in Mixed-Oligopoly Markets

Author

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  • German Coloma

    (Department of Economics, CEMA University, Argentina)

Abstract

This paper develops an oligopoly model with firms that may potentially be state-owned or privately owned and solves it for different cases in which the number and ownership of those firms vary. The results are then compared in terms of total surplus and consumer surplus, and this comparison produces implications for the antitrust appraisal of possible mergers and acquisitions. It follows that certain types of mergers are unambiguously favorable or unfavorable from the point of view of their contribution to both total and consumer surplus, while others may be beneficial in one of those dimensions but harmful in the other dimension.

Suggested Citation

  • German Coloma, 2006. "Mergers and Acquisitions in Mixed-Oligopoly Markets," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(2), pages 147-159, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:5:y:2006:i:2:p:147-159
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William C. Merrill & Norman Schneider, 1966. "Government Firms in Oligopoly Industries: A Short-Run Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 400-412.
    2. Cook, Paul & Fabella, Raul V, 2002. "The Welfare and Political Economy Dimensions of Private versus State Enterprise," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(2), pages 246-261, March.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, September.
    4. Sang‐Ho Lee & Hae‐Shin Hwang, 2003. "Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 324-335, September.
    5. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, September.
    6. David Sappington & J. Sidak, 2003. "Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(3), pages 183-206, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Johan Willner, 2013. "The welfare impact of a managerial oligopoly with an altruistic firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(2), pages 97-115, June.
    2. Yoshio Kamijo & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2009. "Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 1-24, September.
    3. Kohei Kamaga & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2007. "The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 6(3), pages 181-198, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mergers and acquisitions; mixed oligopoly; public enterprise;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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