Perpetual Leapfrogging in Bertrand Duopoly
We consider different patterns of infinite technological adoption choices by firms in a Bertrand duopoly. Every period technological progress provides a sequence of cost reducing innovations. The equilibrium concept is Markov perfect equilibrium. We analyze conditions for which equilibrium adoption leads to persistent leadership and those where firms alternate in adoption inducing leapfrogging. Only leapfrogging (cads to technological improvement in the long run. Demand conditions play a crucial role in determining whether leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand duopoly.
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Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- Christopher Budd & Christopher Harris & John Vickers, 1993. "A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 543-573.
- Kapur, Sandeep, 1995. "Technological Diffusion with Social Learning," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 173-195, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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