IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ibn/jpl123/v19y2026i1p22.html

Economic Guarantees of Security: A New Architecture of Peace

Author

Listed:
  • Aleksandr Rozenfeld

Abstract

This article introduces and theoretically substantiates the concept of economic guarantees of security — a new class of international commitments aimed at preventing aggression and ensuring the implementation of peace treaties. The traditional security system relies on political and military deterrence, while the economic factor usually plays a reactive role through sanctions and compensation after conflict (Baldwin, 1997). A different approach is proposed- the use of pre-established economic consequences for violations of agreements and, conversely, material incentives for maintaining peace (Rozenfeld, 2024). The key idea is the institutionalization of economic guarantees in the form of “special sections” of international agreements that define concrete financial enforcement mechanisms- funds, bonds, insurance instruments, and asset freezes based on predetermined criteria (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009). This solution makes the security system economically enforceable, turning war into a financially disadvantageous action (Fearon, 1995).

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksandr Rozenfeld, 2026. "Economic Guarantees of Security: A New Architecture of Peace," Journal of Politics and Law, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 19(1), pages 1-22, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:jpl123:v:19:y:2026:i:1:p:22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/download/0/0/52594/57291
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/view/0/52594
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/c8dmi8nm4pdjkuc9g8m2hh491 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Chang, Yang-Ming & Sanders, Shane & Walia, Bhavneet, 2015. "The costs of conflict: A choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-65.
    3. Charles H. Anderton, 2017. "The bargaining theory of war and peace," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 12(2), pages 10-15, October.
    4. Clayton L. Thyne, 2006. "Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(6), pages 937-961, December.
    5. Austin L. Wright, 2016. "Economic Shocks and Rebel," HiCN Working Papers 232, Households in Conflict Network.
    6. Jillienne Haglund, 2016. "Leslie Johns. 2015. Strengthening international courts: The hidden costs of legalization. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 151-154, March.
    7. Eric Sjöberg, 2014. "Settlement under the threat of conflict-The cost of asymmetric information," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2014_02, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    8. Alejandro Quiroz Flores, 2011. "Alliances as Contiguity in Spatial Models of Military Expenditures," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 402-418, September.
    9. Cattaneo, Cristina & Foreman, Timothy, 2023. "Climate change, international migration, and interstate conflicts," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    10. Magnus Lundgren, 2017. "Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 613-641, December.
    11. Blouin, Max & Pallage, Stéphane, 2016. "Warlords, famine and food aid: Who fights, who starves?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 18-38.
    12. Kjetil Bjorvatn & Alireza Naghavi, 2010. "Rent seekers in rentier states: When greed brings peace," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 039, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    13. Chan, Kenneth S. & Laffargue, Jean-Pierre, 2016. "Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 138-150.
    14. Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2017. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 168-184.
    15. Stoop, Nik & Verpoorten, Marijke & van der Windt, Peter, 2019. "Artisanal or industrial conflict minerals? Evidence from Eastern Congo," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 660-674.
    16. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    17. Jonathan M. DiCicco & Jack S. Levy, 1999. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 675-704, December.
    18. Faisal Z. Ahmed, 2022. "From grievances to civil war: The impact of geopolitics," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 427-451, July.
    19. Azam, Jean-Paul, 2023. "Was Lucifer a Gambler? A Rational-Choice Hermeneutic of Peter Olivi’s Treatise on Demons," TSE Working Papers 23-1483, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2024.
    20. Maia Carter Hallward & Taib Biygautane, 2024. "Arab State Narratives on Normalization with Israel: Justifying Policy Reversal," Contemporary Review of the Middle East, , vol. 11(1), pages 23-49, March.
    21. Işıl İdrisoğlu & William Spaniel, 2024. "Information problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 514-533, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibn:jpl123:v:19:y:2026:i:1:p:22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Canadian Center of Science and Education (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepflch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.