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Power Shifts and Problem Shifts

Author

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  • Jonathan M. DiCicco
  • Jack S. Levy

    (Department of Political Science, Rutgers University)

Abstract

This article analyzes the evolution of power transition theory from the perspective of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs. The authors reconstruct the development of the power transition research program by analyzing its hard core of irrefutable assumptions, its negative and positive heuristics, and exemplary works contributing to its protective belt of testable auxiliary hypotheses. It is argued that some developments (e.g., Lemke's multiple hierarchy model) constitute progressive problemshifts, but other areas of the research program exhibit signs of degeneration. These include the treatment of the timing and initiation of wars associated with power transitions and causal mechanisms driving such wars. Findings show that the evolution of the power transition research program has generally been progressive in Lakatosian terms, but its future vitality will require continued efforts to explain the above-mentioned theoretical and empirical anomalies in a way that is consistent with the hard core of the research program and that generates new testable propositions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan M. DiCicco & Jack S. Levy, 1999. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 675-704, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:6:p:675-704
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043006001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    2. Vasquez, John A., 1997. "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(4), pages 899-912, December.
    3. Doran, Charles F. & Parsons, Wes, 1980. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 947-965, December.
    4. Douglas Lemke & William Reed, 1996. "Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 143-164, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michelle Benson, 2007. "Extending the Bounds of Power Transition Theory," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(3), pages 211-215, July.

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