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The Evolution of Citizen Participation and Regulatory Success

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  • Ken-Ichi Akao
  • Geumsoo Kim

Abstract

In an evolutionary game setting we have shown that either perfect compliance or perfect non-compliance with a regulation can evolve as an asymptotically stable state. However, this depends critically on the size of a defector¡¯s additional payoff when there is no private monitoring to a cooperator¡¯s payoff, relative to his expected fine from an enforcer¡¯s monitoring. As an enforcer¡¯s willingness to monitor voluntarily gets affected by their relative share of the population to the defectors¡¯, the society could be stuck in the neighborhood of the initial state if many defectors already exist and a little larger than enforcers, even though the regulatory agency has a strong policy in its enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken-Ichi Akao & Geumsoo Kim, 2017. "The Evolution of Citizen Participation and Regulatory Success," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(6), pages 179-187, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:9:y:2017:i:6:p:179-187
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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