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The Evolution of Citizen Participation and Regulatory Success

Author

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  • Ken-Ichi Akao
  • Geumsoo Kim

Abstract

In an evolutionary game setting we have shown that either perfect compliance or perfect non-compliance with a regulation can evolve as an asymptotically stable state. However, this depends critically on the size of a defector¡¯s additional payoff when there is no private monitoring to a cooperator¡¯s payoff, relative to his expected fine from an enforcer¡¯s monitoring. As an enforcer¡¯s willingness to monitor voluntarily gets affected by their relative share of the population to the defectors¡¯, the society could be stuck in the neighborhood of the initial state if many defectors already exist and a little larger than enforcers, even though the regulatory agency has a strong policy in its enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken-Ichi Akao & Geumsoo Kim, 2017. "The Evolution of Citizen Participation and Regulatory Success," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(6), pages 179-187, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:9:y:2017:i:6:p:179-187
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stranlund John K., 1995. "Public Mechanisms to Support Compliance to an Environmental Norm," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 205-222, March.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    4. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    citizen participation; evolutionary game; monitoring; regulation; social capital;

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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