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Profiling zur Vermeidung von Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit : erste Ergebnisse aus einem Modellprojekt (Profiling to avoid long-term unemployment : first results from a model project)

Author

Listed:
  • Rudolph, Helmut
  • Müntnich, Michael

Abstract

"The paper presents first results from the model project 'profiling' which was conducted from 1.12.1999 until 30.6.2001 in three employment offices with financial support from the EU Commission. Two objectives of equal importance were pursued in the project: the development and testing of a profiling instrument for the early identification of unemployed individuals with an increased risk of becoming long-term unemployed, and the testing of a possible method of preventing long-term unemployment by means of early case management. The project was structured in such a way that the accuracy of the profiling instrument and the effect of the case management could be evaluated by means of a randomly selected control group. The profiling instrument developed in the project consists of a list of statistical characteristics of the newly registered unemployed persons, and a checklist for a classification to be made by the placement officers as regards integration difficulties in connection with qualifications, mobility willingness, motivation and behaviour. In addition the placement officers gave an assessment regarding the risk of possible long-term unemployment. The profiling instrument facilitated a certain prognostic separation into a group of unemployed persons with no recognisable risk and one with an increased risk of long-term unemployment. The average duration of unemployment, the rate of transition into long-term unemployment and the frequency of return to employment differ between the two groups. According to findings so far, the case management in the model project did not lead to a better prevention of long-term unemployment in the short term. It has not (yet) been possible, however, to obtain information as to the quality and stability of the integration." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Rudolph, Helmut & Müntnich, Michael, 2001. "Profiling zur Vermeidung von Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit : erste Ergebnisse aus einem Modellprojekt (Profiling to avoid long-term unemployment : first results from a model project)," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 34(4), pages 530-553.
    • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabmit:v:34:i:4:p:530-553
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bruce D. Meyer, 1995. "Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 91-131, March.
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