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Capacity Constraint, Merger Paradox And Welfare-Improving Pro-Merger Policy

Author

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  • DONG, BAOMIN
  • GUO, GUIXIA
  • QIAN, XIAOLIN
  • WANG, FRANK YONG

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the "Merger Paradox" (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983) is mitigated when capacity constraint is considered. This is because outside firms who do not participate in a merger cannot expand their output beyond their existing capacity, and therefore, Stigler type of free riding is alleviated. When overcapacity is socially costly, it is also shown that a pro-merger fiscal policy may discourage ex ante capacity investment and hence alleviate overcapacity, if capacity building is not too costly. Furthermore, it can be shown that the optimal pro-merger subsidy is always welfare improving when it discourages capacity building.

Suggested Citation

  • Dong, Baomin & Guo, Guixia & Qian, Xiaolin & Wang, Frank Yong, 2016. "Capacity Constraint, Merger Paradox And Welfare-Improving Pro-Merger Policy," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 57(1), pages 1-26, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:57:y:2016:i:1:p:1-26
    DOI: 10.15057/27944
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cheung, Francis K., 1992. "Two remarks on the equilibrium analysis of horizontal merger," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 119-123, September.
    2. Haskel, Jonathan & Martin, Christopher, 1994. "Capacity and Competition: Empirical Evidence on UK Panel Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 23-44, March.
    3. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-227, March.
    4. H. Youn Kim & Junsoo Lee, 2001. "Quasi-fixed inputs and long-run equilibrium in production: a cointegration analysis," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 41-57.
    5. Dutz, Mark A., 1989. "Horizontal mergers in declining industries : Theory and evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 11-33, March.
    6. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    7. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2017. "Merger Paradox in a Network Product Market: A Horizontally Differentiated Three-Firm Model," Discussion Paper Series 167, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Sep 2017.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capacity constraint; merger paradox; overcapacity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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