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Research on Incentive Mechanisms in the Data Market Based on a Multitask Principal–Agent Model

Author

Listed:
  • Nan Jiang

    (Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Yiwen Ma

    (Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

In the Web 2.0 era, data have emerged as a pivotal element in driving the sustainable development of the digital economy. Data markets play a crucial role in enhancing the circulation and allocation of data as a production factor, thereby supporting sustainable development goals. Through a comparative analysis of China’s data market dynamics and global trends, we identify systemic challenges in reconciling data security and market circulation. This study introduces a multitask principal–agent model grounded in mechanism design theory, examining the relationship between the data market regulator (principal) and the data exchange platform (agent) to develop a comprehensive incentive mechanism that optimizes both data circulation and security. The study finds that factors such as the marginal cost of public resources, data security uncertainty, the absolute risk aversion of the data exchange platform, and the marginal social benefit of data security significantly influence the effectiveness of these incentive mechanisms. These insights provide actionable guidance for subsequent policymaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Nan Jiang & Yiwen Ma, 2025. "Research on Incentive Mechanisms in the Data Market Based on a Multitask Principal–Agent Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(4), pages 1-26, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:4:p:1623-:d:1592171
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    References listed on IDEAS

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