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Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Waste Tire Pyrolysis Promotion: The Role of Differential Carbon Taxation and Policy Coordination

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  • Xiaojun Shen

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, 1239 Siping Road, Yangpu District, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

In China, the recycling system for waste tires is characterized by high output but low standardized recovery rates. This study examines the environmental and health risks caused by non-compliant treatment by individual recyclers and explores the barriers to the large-scale adoption of Pyrolysis Technology. A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model involving pyrolysis plants, waste tire recyclers, and government regulators is developed. The model incorporates pollutants from pretreatment and pyrolysis processes into a unified metric—Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO 2 -eq)—based on Global Warming Potential (GWP), and designs a Differential Carbon Taxation mechanism accordingly. The strategy dynamics and stability conditions for Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) are analyzed. Multi-scenario numerical simulations explore how key parameter changes influence evolutionary trajectories and equilibrium outcomes. Six typical equilibrium states are identified, along with the critical conditions for achieving environmentally friendly results. Based on theoretical analysis and simulation results, targeted policy recommendations are proposed to promote standardized waste tire pyrolysis: (1) Establish a phased dynamic carbon tax with supporting subsidies; (2) Build a green market cultivation and price stabilization system; (3) Implement performance-based differential incentives; (4) Strengthen coordination between central environmental inspections and local carbon tax enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaojun Shen, 2025. "Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Waste Tire Pyrolysis Promotion: The Role of Differential Carbon Taxation and Policy Coordination," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(14), pages 1-23, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:14:p:6422-:d:1700983
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