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Structuring Bureaucratic Performance? Assessing the Policy Impact of Environmental Agency Design

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  • Neal D. Woods

    (Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA)

Abstract

Recent research suggests that the structural design of American state environmental agencies impacts their performance, with agencies that combine environmental protection with other functions like public health or natural resource management regulating pollution emissions less stringently than those that focus exclusively on environmental protection. Using a set of panel data models, this study assesses this claim across several major U.S. environmental programs, including those regulating air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste. The results are mixed. Though support for the agency structure hypothesis is found in some models, taken together, the findings tend to refute the notion that an environmental agency’s structure has systematic, predictable impacts on its regulatory performance across programs and regulatory activities. Rather, they suggest that the effects of agency design may be more nuanced and context-dependent than articulations of this theory commonly suggest.

Suggested Citation

  • Neal D. Woods, 2024. "Structuring Bureaucratic Performance? Assessing the Policy Impact of Environmental Agency Design," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(17), pages 1-11, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:17:p:7505-:d:1467306
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luke Fowler & Chris Birdsall, 2021. "Does the Primacy System Work? State versus Federal Implementation of the Clean Water Act," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 51(1), pages 131-160.
    2. Neal D. Woods, 2022. "Regulatory competition, administrative discretion, and environmental policy implementation," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 39(4), pages 486-511, July.
    3. Neal D. Woods, 2006. "Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy in the U.S. States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 36(2), pages 259-276.
    4. Macey, Jonathan R, 1992. "Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 93-110, March.
    5. John A. Hoornbeek, 2005. "The Promises and Pitfalls of Devolution: Water Pollution Policies in the American States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 35(1), pages 87-114, Winter.
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