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The New Path to Improve Construction Safety Performance in China: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Zongjie Pi

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Xin Gao

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Linyan Chen

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Jinghua Liu

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

Evidence shows that there are many work-related accidents and injuries happening in construction projects and governments have taken a series of administrative measures to reduce casualties in recent years. However, traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to ignoring market forces, and thus new measures should be conducted. This study develops a perspective of safety performance (SP) for construction projects in China and puts forward a conception of the safety information system by using several brainstorming sessions to strengthen the safety supervision of participants in the construction industry. This system provides rating information to the public, and bad performance contractors enter into a blacklist which will influence their economic activities. Considering the limited rationality of government and various contractors, this paper builds a reasonable evolutionary game model to verify the feasibility of the safety information system. The analysis results show that there is not a single set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs), as different situations may lead to different ESSs. The efficiency of applying the safety information system (the blacklist) in the construction industry can be proved by reducing the government’s safety supervision cost and by enhancing construction safety at the same time.

Suggested Citation

  • Zongjie Pi & Xin Gao & Linyan Chen & Jinghua Liu, 2019. "The New Path to Improve Construction Safety Performance in China: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(13), pages 1-24, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:13:p:2443-:d:246939
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zheng Zhu & Jingfeng Yuan & Qiuhu Shao & Lei Zhang & Guangqi Wang & Xuewei Li, 2020. "Developing Key Safety Management Factors for Construction Projects in China: A Resilience Perspective," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(17), pages 1-20, August.
    2. Akeem Pedro & Anh-Tuan Pham-Hang & Phong Thanh Nguyen & Hai Chien Pham, 2022. "Data-Driven Construction Safety Information Sharing System Based on Linked Data, Ontologies, and Knowledge Graph Technologies," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(2), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Shitao Gong & Xin Gao & Zhou Li & Linyan Chen, 2021. "Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-29, March.
    4. Dian Sun & Lupeng Zhang & Zifeng Su, 2020. "Evacuate or Stay? A Typhoon Evacuation Decision Model in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory in Complex Networks," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(3), pages 1-17, January.
    5. Kiran Khurshid & Aamar Danish & Muhammad Usama Salim & Muhammed Bayram & Togay Ozbakkaloglu & Mohammad Ali Mosaberpanah, 2023. "An In-Depth Survey Demystifying the Internet of Things (IoT) in the Construction Industry: Unfolding New Dimensions," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-24, January.
    6. Wang Xiaoyang & Noor Azuan Hashim, 2023. "Conceptual Frameworks of Strategic Management," Foresight and STI Governance (Foresight-Russia till No. 3/2015), National Research University Higher School of Economics, vol. 17(3), pages 78-87.

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