Safety regulation vs. liability with heterogeneous probabilities of suit
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- Sébastien Rouillon, 2006. "Safety regulation vs. Liability with heterogeneous probabilities of suit," Post-Print hal-00275617, HAL.
- Sébastien Rouillon, 2008. "Safety Regulation vs. Liability with Heterogeneous Probabilities of Suit," Post-Print hal-00257397, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000.
"On the joint use of liability and safety regulation,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Robert D. Cooter, 1991. "Economic Theories of Legal Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 11-30, Summer.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2002. "Economic analysis of law," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1661-1784 Elsevier.
- Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA), 2008. "Variable Probabilities of Suit and Liability Rules," Cahiers du GREThA 2008-15, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric, 2015.
"On the political economy of public safety investments,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 7-16.
- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2014. "On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments," Post-Print hal-01411782, HAL.
- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2014. "On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-8, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2014. "On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments," Post-Print hal-01411775, HAL.
- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2015. "On the political economy of public safety investments," Post-Print hal-01385951, HAL.
- Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
- Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
- Reinshagen, Felix, 2011. "Standards and Incentives in Safety Regulation," Munich Dissertations in Economics 13430, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Michel, Stephan & Romano, Alessandro & Zannini, Ugo, 2017. "Joint Use of Liability and Regulation in Environmental Law," ILE Working Paper Series 5, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
- Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo Group Munich.
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