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White List: An Administrative Tool to Contrast Crime

Author

Listed:
  • Amelia Barletta

    (Department of Economics, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, 81043 Capua, Italy)

  • Carlo Capuano

    (Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Naples Federico II, 80126 Naples, Italy)

  • Alessandro De Iudicibus

    (Department of Economics, University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, 81043 Capua, Italy)

Abstract

White Lists are lists of firms set up at each Italian prefecture. It is a relatively young instrument born as an experimental project designed to solve problems for particular conditions of crime and corruption in the Italian territory. This work aims to understand if the “White List” tool can represent a reliable legality tool for the contracting station and representation for firms registered in these lists, an incentive to obtain awards for faster times of public procurement. Through a descriptive survey, we will try to photograph the “White List” phenomenon by comparing firms belonging to these lists with companies not belonging to them but which are similar in terms of size and economic sector. The comparison takes off some differences in the financial structure of the two groups of companies. in particular, the White List’s firms show a better profitability and a lower recourse to third-party capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Amelia Barletta & Carlo Capuano & Alessandro De Iudicibus, 2021. "White List: An Administrative Tool to Contrast Crime," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-16, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:8-:d:714243
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "The dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 427-443, March.
    3. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    4. Claudio Detotto & Edoardo Otranto, 2010. "Does Crime Affect Economic Growth?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 330-345, August.
    5. Isaac Ehrlich, 1974. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 68-134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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