Impact Analysis of Price Cap on Bidding Strategies of VPP Considering Imbalance Penalty Structures

Virtual power plants (VPPs) enable the efficient participation of distributed renewable energy resources in electricity markets by aggregating them. However, the profitability of VPPs is challenged by market volatility and regulatory constraints, such as price caps and imbalance penalties. This study examines the joint impact of varying price cap levels and imbalance penalty structures on the bidding strategies and revenues of VPPs. A stochastic optimization model was developed, where a three-stage scenario tree was utilized to capture the uncertainty in electricity prices and renewable generation output. Simulations were performed under various market conditions using real-world price and generation data from the Korean electricity market. The analysis reveals that higher price cap coefficients lead to greater revenue and more segmented bidding strategies, especially under asymmetric penalty structures. Segment-wise analysis of bid price–quantity pairs shows that over-bidding is preferred under upward-only penalty schemes, while under-bidding is preferred under downward-only ones. Notably, revenue improvement tapers off beyond a price cap coefficient of 0.8, which indicates that there exists an optimal threshold for regulatory design. The findings of this study suggest the need for coordination between price caps and imbalance penalties to maintain market efficiency while supporting renewable energy integration. The proposed framework also offers practical insights for market operators and policymakers seeking to balance profitability, adaptability, and stability in VPP-integrated electricity markets.