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Global warming policy: some economic implications

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Abstract

Many analysts believe that the emissions of greenhouse gases resulting from human activity are contributing to global warming, but the linkage is highly uncertain. The largest such source of these gases is carbon dioxide (CO2) from the growing consumption of fossil fuels. Consequently, the conservation of fossil fuels figures prominently in any strategy to reduce the threat of global warming. Because there is considerable uncertainty about the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions but the costs of conservation can be readily quantified, some analysts have suggested that reducing the emissions is like insurance. In this article, Stephen Brown integrates a growing literature on the damage caused by global warming with a world energy model to do a cost-benefit analysis of U.S. compliance with the accord adopted at the United Nations conference on global warming held in late 1997. His analysis shows that reducing U.S. emissions to comply with the accord would represent too much insurance against global warming.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen P. A. Brown, 1998. "Global warming policy: some economic implications," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q IV, pages 26-35.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedder:y:1998:i:qiv:p:26-35
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen P. A. Brown & Hillard G. Huntington, 2003. "Terms of trade and OECD policies to mitigate global climate change," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    2. Ross McKitrick, 2001. "Mitigation versus compensation in global warming policy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(2), pages 1-6.
    3. Pervez Zamurrad Janjua & Ghulam Samad & Nazakat Ullah Khan, 2010. "Impact of Climate Change on Wheat Production: A Case Study of Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 799-822.
    4. Sexton, Steven & Eyer, Jonathan, 2016. "Leveling the playing field of transportation fuels: Accounting for indirect emissions of natural gas," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 21-31.
    5. Tyas Mutiara Basuki & Hunggul Yudono Setio Hadi Nugroho & Yonky Indrajaya & Irfan Budi Pramono & Nunung Puji Nugroho & Agung Budi Supangat & Dewi Retna Indrawati & Endang Savitri & Nining Wahyuningrum, 2022. "Improvement of Integrated Watershed Management in Indonesia for Mitigation and Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(16), pages 1-41, August.

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