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Cumplimiento en pago de contribuciones: autoridades fiscales versus religiosas en México

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Augusto Chávez Maza

    (CEDES/Benemérita Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Puebla)

  • Alexander Elbittar

    (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)

  • Fausto Hernández Trillo

    (CIDE/Kellogg Institute for International Studies)

Abstract

This paper studies fiscal correspondence and fiscal trust. Through an experimental design carried out in Oaxaca, Mexico it explores which authority, the religious or the civil one, is better at collecting contributions to finance common goods. Results suggest that fiscal correspondence is the main factor to explain better collection. That is, when the good is observable, people are more willing to pay the contribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Augusto Chávez Maza & Alexander Elbittar & Fausto Hernández Trillo, 2015. "Cumplimiento en pago de contribuciones: autoridades fiscales versus religiosas en México," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(1), pages 51-74.
  • Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:30:y:2015:i:1:p:51-74
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    File URL: http://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/archivo/EstudiosEconomicos2015/51-74.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hernandez-Trillo, Fausto, 2016. "Poverty Alleviation in Federal Systems: The Case of México," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 204-214.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    confianza fiscal; correspondencia fiscal; aportaciones voluntarias; experimentos en campo;

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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