Smoking in Restaurants: Who Best to Set the House Rules?
Alamar and Glantz interpret smoking in restaurants as a market failure, and they claim that restaurants should welcome government laws that disallow smoking in all restaurants. Contrary to their claims, restaurant owners do have an incentive to eliminate smoking if doing so raises the value of their restaurants. In restaurants, smokers do not impose negative externalities on non-smokers because restaurant owners have well-defined property rights that cause them to internalize the costs and benefits of smoking. Alamar and Glantz claim to show that non-smoking ordinances increase the capital value of restaurants, but their own data do not, in fact, show that. Finally, if it were true that eliminating smoking in restaurants raises the value of restaurants, then the proper approach would be, not to coerce restaurant owners, but to inform them of that fact.
Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Benjamin C. Alamar & Stanton A. Glantz, 2004. "Smoke-free Ordinances Increase Restaurant Profit and Value," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 22(4), pages 520-525, October.
- J. Dunham & ML. Marlow, 2000. "Smoking laws and their differential effects on restaurants, bars, and taverns," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(3), pages 326-333, 07.
- Alamar, B C & Glantz, Stanton A. Ph.D., 2004. "Smoke-free ordinances increase restaurant profit and value," University of California at San Francisco, Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education qt91w950j4, Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, UC San Francisco.
- Jeff DeSimone & Edward J. Schumacher, 2004. "Compensating Wage Differentials and AIDS Risk," NBER Working Papers 10861, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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