Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the "New" Fertilizer Subsidies
Summary Fertilizer subsidies have been reinstituted in many African countries with innovations seeking to avoid the downsides of past programs. The new subsidy paradigm however does not address how to curtail political manipulation which exacerbated inefficiencies of previous programs. This paper analyzes whether politics affected voucher allocations in Ghana's 2008 fertilizer subsidy program. We find that more vouchers were targeted to districts that the ruling party had lost in the previous presidential elections and more so in districts that had been lost by a higher percentage margin. This evidence shows that a significant threat to the efficiency of fertilizer subsidies remains.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June.
- Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529.
- Jayne, T. S. & Govereh, J. & Wanzala, M. & Demeke, M., 2003. "Fertilizer market development: a comparative analysis of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 293-316, August.
- Case, A., 1997.
"Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from Albania,"
177, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
- Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
- Case, A, 1996. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution : Recent Evidence from Albania," Papers 177, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Anne Case, 1997. "Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence From Albania," Working Papers 227, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
- Shawn A. Cole, 2008.
"Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India,"
Harvard Business School Working Papers
09-001, Harvard Business School.
- Shawn Cole, 2009. "Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 219-50, January.
- Minot, Nicholas & Benson, Todd, 2009. "Fertilizer subsidies in Africa: Are vouchers the answer?," Issue briefs 60, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Krausova, Marika & Banful, Afua Branoah, 2010. "Overview of the agricultural input sector in Ghana," IFPRI discussion papers 1024, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2007. "Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 464-484, March.
- Dahlberg, M. & Johansson, E., 1999.
"On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments,"
1999:24, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Working Paper Series 1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:39:y:2011:i:7:p:1166-1176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.