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Partisan patent examiners? Exploring the link between the political ideology of patent examiners and patent office outcomes

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  • Raffiee, Joseph
  • Teodoridis, Florenta
  • Fehder, Daniel

Abstract

Patents are key strategic resources which enable firms to appropriate innovation returns and prevent rival imitation. Patent examiners – individuals who may be subject to various sources of bias – play a central role in determining which inventions are awarded patent rights. Using a novel dataset, we explore if one increasingly prevalent source of bias – political ideology – manifests in examiner decision-making. Reassuringly, our analysis suggests that the political ideology of patent examiners is largely unrelated to patent office outcomes. However, we do find evidence suggesting politically active conservative-leaning examiners are more likely to grant patents relative to politically active liberal-leaning examiners, but only for patent applications where there is ambiguity regarding what constitutes patentable subject matter and hence examiners have greater discretion.

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  • Raffiee, Joseph & Teodoridis, Florenta & Fehder, Daniel, 2023. "Partisan patent examiners? Exploring the link between the political ideology of patent examiners and patent office outcomes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(9).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:52:y:2023:i:9:s0048733323001373
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2023.104853
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