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The welfare effects of discriminating between in-state and out-of-state students

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  • Hübner, Malte

Abstract

In countries with a decentralized provision of higher education, local governments have incentives to levy higher fees on out-of-state students. This paper analyzes the implications of such preferential fee regimes for welfare and the number of students in a federation by means of a theoretical model in which higher education policies are determined non-cooperatively by local governments. In contrast to the literature on preferential tax regimes (e.g. Keen, 2001; Haupt and Peters, 2005), in my model, a restriction of preferential fee regimes raises federal welfare and enrollment in higher education.

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  • Hübner, Malte, 2012. "The welfare effects of discriminating between in-state and out-of-state students," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 364-374.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:42:y:2012:i:1:p:364-374
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.06.005
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    1. Kemnitz, Alexander, 2005. "Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees," Discussion Papers 617, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    2. Groen, Jeffrey A. & White, Michelle J., 2004. "In-state versus out-of-state students: the divergence of interest between public universities and state governments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1793-1814, August.
    3. Oliver Busch & Benjamin Weigert, 2010. "Where have all the graduates gone? Internal cross-state migration of graduates in Germany 1984–2004," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 44(3), pages 559-572, June.
    4. Keen, Michael, 2001. "Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(4), pages 757-762, December.
    5. Janeba, Eckhard & Peters, Wolfgang, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 93-101, January.
    6. Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, 2008. "The Bologna process: how student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(2), pages 109-130, April.
    7. Justman, Moshe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1997. "Implications of the mobility of skilled labor for local public funding of higher education," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 409-412, September.
    8. Moshe Justman & Jacques-Francois Thisse, 2000. "Local Public Funding of Higher Education When Skilled Labor is Imperfectly Mobile," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(3), pages 247-258, May.
    9. Keen, Michael, 2001. "Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 4), pages 757-62, December.
    10. Noorbakhsh, Abbas & Culp, David, 2002. "The demand for higher education: Pennsylvania's nonresident tuition experience," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 277-286, June.
    11. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September.
    12. Tim Krieger & Thomas Lange, 2010. "Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(6), pages 587-606, December.
    13. Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(3), pages 259-280, May.
    14. Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2002. "Tax Setting in a Federal System: The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(3), pages 235-257, May.
    15. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    16. Schwager, Robert, 2007. "Public Universities, Tuition and Competition: A Tiebout Model," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger & Thomas Lange, 2011. "Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility," Working Papers CIE 35, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    2. Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger & Thomas Lange, 2016. "Competition for the international pool of talent," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(4), pages 1113-1154, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Higher education; Tuition fees; Preferential tax regimes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid

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